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This book examines the challenges of scepticism and relativism to religious knowledge after the demise of classical foundationalism. Whereas scepticism doubts whether we can know truth, relativism doubts whether we can find a sufficiently objective perspective to adjudicate strong disagreement about truth. Thus relativism involves scepticism about rationality rather than truth.
Michael G. Harvey examines how the exclusive disjunction of objectivism or relativism has motivated the search for a more objective perspectivein religion and theology, and how it has shaped both the question of whether religious language is meaningful and the question of whether religious belief is rational. Drawing from insights in both the analytic and continental traditions in philosophy, he argues that belief in God is valid as it stands.
Table of Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part One: The Exclusive Disjunction of Objectivism or Relativism
1 Religious Language, Reference, and Autonomy
2 Revelation, Imagination, and Arbitrariness
Part Two: A Hermeneutical Model of Rationality
3 Rationality, Relativism, and Skepticism
4 Tradition, Worldviews, and Conflict
5 Science, Rationality, and Theology
Part Three: A Kierkegaardian Perspective on Religious Knowledge
6 Faith, Knowledge, and Belief
7 Faith, Knowledge, and Truth
8 Faith, Knowledge, and Suffering
Conclusion
Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part One: The Exclusive Disjunction of Objectivism or Relativism
1 Religious Language, Reference, and Autonomy
2 Revelation, Imagination, and Arbitrariness
Part Two: A Hermeneutical Model of Rationality
3 Rationality, Relativism, and Skepticism
4 Tradition, Worldviews, and Conflict
5 Science, Rationality, and Theology
Part Three: A Kierkegaardian Perspective on Religious Knowledge
6 Faith, Knowledge, and Belief
7 Faith, Knowledge, and Truth
8 Faith, Knowledge, and Suffering
Conclusion
Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index
